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ORIGINAL ARTICLE

An Analysis of the Slovenian Tax Administration
Response During COVID-19: Between Normative
Measures and Economic Reality
Polonca Kovac*, Maja Klun
University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Public Administration, Ljubljana, Slovenia

Abstract
Tax administration plays a key role in tax collection, striving for maximum public ﬁnance revenue, while at the same
time protecting the rights of the taxpayers in tax collection procedures. The search for this balance is particularly relevant
in times of crisis, as shown by the COVID-19 pandemic, especially in the ﬁrst wave between March and June 2020. The
article deals with the legal and economic aspects of work of the Financial Administration of the Republic of Slovenia
(FARS) based on comparable data on tax measures in other countries, provided by international organizations such as
IOTA and OECD, i.e. the EU. The article ﬁnds that in Slovenia the measures under consideration were often questionable already at the formal level, which led to a gap in the implementation of ‘intervention laws’ despite the relatively
agile response by FARS. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that Slovenia's public ﬁnance measures match the measures
taken by other EU Member States. Also worth mentioning in such regard is that some of the measures, for example those
regarding e-operation, were identiﬁed by both FARS and taxpayers as improvements to be preserved even after the
pandemic, considering tax administration as a service for the state and taxpayers.
Keywords: Tax administration, Tax procedure, COVID-19, Intervention laws and measures, Financial Administration of
the Republic of Slovenia (FARS), International comparison
JEL classiﬁcation: K34

Introduction
n order to function properly and enjoy ﬁscal
sovereignty, every country needs ﬁnancial resources, the provision of which is largely ensured
through tax collection by the national tax administration. The latter collects taxes in various procedures whereby, according to the convergence rules of
the European Union (EU) and the national laws of
the Member States, the tax procedure is considered
a predominantly administrative relationship. As
such, it is characterised by several speciﬁc features,
for example statute of limitation or an emphasised
ne bis in idem rule, as tax collection is a procedure in
the public interest in the sense of ﬁlling the public
coffers, while maintaining concern for a balanced
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protection of rights (more on development within
the EU see Nykiel & Sek, 2009, and Pistone, 2020).
The tax system and public ﬁnances have several
functions. In addition to the basic ﬁnancial purpose
of taxes and allocation of public goods (the regulatory function), particularly in times of a crisis the
redistribution and stabilisation functions come to
the fore (Klun & Jovanovic, 2016). Tax administrations are organised differently in different countries,
yet share some common principles and rules of
operation, mostly deriving from EU directives and
their further transposition into national law.
Tax collection is a challenging task already in
“normal” circumstances. Though, when any major
crisis occurs, the regulators of tax legislation as well
as tax administrations need to deal with the
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additional challenges, since even taxpayers that
would usually contribute to public spending simply
do not have the same amount of resources at their
disposal due to the highly reduced business and
consumption. With the spread of the SARS-CoV-2
virus resulting, according to the World Health Organization data, in over 84 million infections and
1.843 million conﬁrmed deaths globally, and the
corresponding limiting business measures, the
COVID-19 pandemic has affected practically all dimensions of society. Accordingly, there is no doubt
that the year 2020 can be labelled as a major health,
economic and social crisis period, which will require
at least several years to bridge the gaps developed
as opposed to operations before the pandemic. This
involves the rights exercised and the obligations
imposed in the relations between authorities and
individual citizens and businesses generally, as well
as the collection of taxes and social assistance
particularly. A key guideline in the design and the
implementation of speciﬁc public policies and the
legal regulation of administrative procedures in
times of crisis is to provide a proportional protection
of the public interest in terms of still assured public
ﬁnances and the facilitation of taxpayers that face
difﬁculties in their operation and income earning
(Kovac & Kersevan, 2020). A major crisis hereby, as
observed already in the ﬁrst wave of the pandemic
in the spring of 2020, requires not merely a revision
but a radical shift from the existing rules and procedures. This is the case especially for Slovenia.
Namely, Slovenia had over 125,000 COVID-19 cases
and 2800 related deaths conﬁrmed until December
2020, which places the country with its two million
population as the second one (after Belgium) by
deaths per capita worldwide.
The purpose of this article is to analyse the work
of the Slovenian tax administration in the light of
the intervention measures adopted during the
COVID-19 pandemic, primarily in the spring of
2020. Further, we aim to compare the adjustments in
tax codiﬁcation and tax procedures run with other
countries or tax administrations’ responses, based
on the data deriving from the Intra-European
Organisation of Tax Administrations (IOTA) and the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD). Thereby, we identify the
strengths and weaknesses of the Slovenian legal
regulation and implementation of tax (and social
beneﬁts) regulations within the competence of the
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tax administration, in order to improve the normative and empirical aspects in the future.
Based on the Communicable Diseases Act,
Slovenia declared an epidemic on 12 March 2020 by
adopting the Order on the Declaration of the COVID19 Epidemic in the Territory of the Republic of
Slovenia.1 The epidemic was ofﬁcially declared over
on 15 May 2020 with effect from 1 June 2020. The
ofﬁcial revocation of the epidemic is important as it
affects the duration of the measures discussed below.
Further, the government in mid-October 2020
declared the second wave of the COVID-19 epidemic
with rather severe comparable measures (e.g. schools
in Slovenia operating exclusively online from
October 2020 even until January 2021). Slovenia
managed to overcome the ﬁrst wave mostly rather
effectively, yet in the autumn and winter of 2020,
unfortunately, Slovenia was among the three most
affected countries in the EU. However, a state of
emergency, which can otherwise be declared pursuant to the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia,
has never been declaredehad it been, the competences of individual branches of government to
remedy the situation would have been regulated
differently (Avbelj, 2019; Zagorc & Bardutzky, 2020).
The article starts with an analysis of the responses
of countries, i.e. governments and tax administrations, to COVID-19. This is followed by a study of
the related intervention measures in Slovenia and of
FARS work with an emphasis on the ﬁrst wave,
since the latest measures are mostly recurring the
former ones from spring 2020 and the effects of the
most recent intervention laws cannot be evaluated
yet. This analysis is concluded by ranking the
adopted tax measures and FARS work according to
the models of agility (Beck et al., 2001; Greve et al.,
2019; Mergel, Ganapati & Whithford, 2020) and coproduction (Ostrom, 1996; Steen & Brandsen, 2020).
These two innovative approaches in public administration seem to be crucial for resilient administrative and tax systems in the long run, as they
ensure sustainable development for various stakeholders in the economy and social communities,
which is a goal of the public administration and the
tax administration also according to the OECD and
IOTA. From an economic point of view, the measures are comparatively analysed in terms of the
scope of tax liability and other impacts on the
functioning of the economy and effects on households. The following two hypotheses are tested:

1
Ofﬁcial Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia (OGRS), No. 19/20, based on the Communicable Diseases Act (in Slovenian: Zakon o nalezljivih boleznih
(ZNB), OGRS, No. 69/95, 47/04, 119/05, 33/06, 49/20-ZIUZEOP).
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 H1: In Slovenia, internationally comparable
intervention measures to curb COVID-19 have
been adopted at the normative level concerning the work of the tax administration in support of the taxpayers.
 H2: In terms of scope and type of measure, the
tax intervention measures in Slovenia are
comparable to those in other countries.
In the further discussion of the adopted measures
and their subsequent implementation, the article
explores which segments can be assessed as positive
and where there are necessary or possible opportunities for improvement, as any crisis as is COVID19 brings both challenges and lessons to be used
when the situation returns to normal.

1 A brief legal and economic outline of tax
collection in Slovenia and the EU
In Slovenia, EUR 17.6 billion of general government revenue was collected in 2019, of which EUR
10.733 billion was allocated to the state budget.2
Slovenia has been a member of the EU since 2004
and of the Eurozone since 2007. The EU funds
represent about 10% of the state budget, while the
country contributes to the EU about a half of that, i.e.
around EUR 500 million. Slovenia is a small country
with approximately 2 million inhabitants and 250,000
companies, of which over 90% are small and medium-sized. The timeline shows an increasingly
efﬁcient collection of public duties, as 5.7% more
funds were collected in 2019 than in 2018 and the tax
debt dropped by 2 percentage points. Real GDP per
capita in 2019 amounted to EUR 20,490, i.e. 73% of
EU-27 (Eurostat, 2020). In terms of purpose of
spending, data relating to the 2020 state budget show
the highest spending in social security (approximately EUR 2.155 billion, including pensions for
around 600,000 pensioners3), nearly 20% in education and sports and a further 12% in security, while
less than 2% of the state budget is allocated directly
for entrepreneurship and competitiveness. However, in Slovenia and other countries alike, these proportions will need to be redeﬁned for the current
and subsequent years because of the COVID-19

pandemic, declared by the World Health Organization and by most countries in mid-March 2020. Thus,
in the middle of the year, Slovenia revised its budget
owing to at least two-month economic stagnation,
decreased exports and imports, lower consumption
and investment, unemployment, etc. For Slovenia,
this means an estimated 6.6% drop in GDP (IMAD,
2020). IMF and EBRD predict a similar forecast for
Slovenia. In fact, the available data show that during
the declared epidemic, tax revenues in Slovenia
went down until the end of November by 7.5%
compared to the same period in 2019.
Since 2014, the Slovenian tax administration has
been a part of the Financial Administration of the
Republic of Slovenia (FARS) governed by the
Financial Administration Act (FAA),4 together with
the relevant tax and procedural laws. The latter
include the Tax Procedure Act (TPA) and the General Administrative Procedure Act (GAPA).5 Despite
its detail norms, GAPA application is important as it
ensures the constitutional principles of equality,
non-retroactivity, the right to be heard, judicial review, etc. The TPA and the GAPA also set de minimis
standards of fair trial. The legal regulation of taxes is
based on several provisions of the Constitution of
the Republic of Slovenia, such as determination of
taxes by law, equal protection of rights, etc. The
Constitution requires that the law determines the
taxpayer, the tax subject, the tax base and the tax
rate, without retroactivity (Avbelj, 2019, commentary
to Article 147 of the Constitution). So far, Slovenia
has not reported any major problems regarding tax
regulations and the work of the tax administration to
the EU. One of the rare cases at the EU Court of
Justice is the Pelati6 case of 2012 concerning the
setting of deadlines under the national corporate
income tax act. The Court then ruled that the
Slovenian regulation complied with the principle of
equivalence, which was however contrary to the
principle of effectiveness, due to binding the taxpayer's application for a tax refund to a period that
was not in the area of inﬂuence of the taxpayer but of
the court. FARS comprises the General Financial
Ofﬁce, the Special Financial Ofﬁce and 15 regional
ﬁnancial ofﬁces employing about 3600 people in
2019, of which 2849 authorised ofﬁcial persons, over

2
Data taken from the FARS 2019 Annual Report (published in February 2020). Slovenia has four public coffers: in addition to the general and local
governments, there are also the pension and health insurance schemes. The main source of revenue planned for 2020 is VAT (39%), followed by personal
income tax (approximately 13%) and corporate income tax (10%).
3
This is a state budget contribution to the Pension and Disability Insurance Institute as the collected contributions for pension and disability insurance
do not sufﬁce to cover all the pensions in the country.
4
In Slovenian: Zakon o ﬁnancni upravi (ZFU), OGRS, No. 25/14.
5
TPA in Slovenian: Zakon o davcnem postopku (ZDavP-2), OGRS, No. 117/06 and amendments; cf. Jerovsek et al., 2008. GAPA in Slovenian: Zakon o
splosnem upravnem postopku (ZUP), OG RS, No. 80/99 and amendments. For GAPA application with highlights from case law in tax matters see Kovac &
Kersevan, 2020.
6
C-603/10 Pelati d.o.o. in the Republic of Slovenia, 18. 10. 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:639.
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1000 controllers, about 420 inspectors, and almost
400 debt collectors. There are around 3 million taxpayers in Slovenia. Several types of tax procedure
apply, covering accounting and assessment, supervision (investigations, control, inspection) and recovery, international cooperation, exchange of
information, as well as punitive measures.
As regards its tax system, which the EU leaves to its
discretion, Slovenia is, generally speaking, a moderate countryeit is not a forerunner in innovative approaches, but follows the trends and strives, inter alia,
for the systemic removal of administrative burden
(for Slovenia see Jerovsek et al., 2008; Kovac, 2018;
comparatively Pistone, 2020). This also reﬂects in the
digitalisation of tax procedures, supported in particular by the online and mobile system eDavki (eTaxes),
which proved to be an effective information tool even
before the COVID-19 outbreak and enabled paperless procedures also during the coronavirus crisis.

2 Analysis of intervention measures in terms
of the work of tax administration
2.1 An international comparison of the key
measures concerning the work of the tax
administration in tax procedures
Although COVID-19 has affected the global
environment, the countries, even within the EU,
have been seeking the most appropriate responses
mostly independently, both in general (see Sigma,
2020) and in the tax area (as shown by comparisons
provided by IOTA, 2020, and OECD, 2020; more
in Rogers-Glabush & Morales, 2020; EC, 2020).
This relative decentralisation or even dispersion is
certainly a reﬂection of several factors, from the
suddenness and scale of COVID-19 that required a
rapid response without the possibility of at least
regional coordination, from the countries' focus on
their own systems despite global competitiveness to
the countries’ autonomy in tax matters in the EU.
Nevertheless, the comparison of national measures
indeed shows convergence in the responses to
COVID-19eat least in terms of the type of measures,
although the details and particularly the overall
scope of funds to restart the economy vary greatly.7
The similarities and differences are both positive
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and negative, featuring for example in the tax ﬁeld
and especially in Slovenia an often reactive instead
of anticipatory top-down approach (cf. Sigma, 2020).
The differences between countries can roughly
be divided into (i) those concerning normative
regulation, above all intervention laws for the
period during and after COVID-19, and (ii) those
concerning non-normative adjustments of the
tax administration and other administrative bodies
in terms of work organisation, management, eprocedures, etc. In the latter case, the factors of
ﬂexibility seem to have been the cultural orientation of the administrative system in relation to the
taxpayers and the economy, as well as the targeted
orientation of governments with top-down approaches or unclear guidelines and shifting responsibilities to individual bodies. Experience, for
example from the post-2008 economic crisis, shows
that in times of a crisis, sustainability and system
incoherence manifest themselves even more profoundly than usual. Therefore, given the intertwining of the two (i and ii), measures at both
levels need to be considered systemically, be it tax
relief and deferrals or other ﬁscal and liquidity
approaches.
The existing institutional and individual analyses
of anti-coronavirus measures feature quite different
categorisations, as each organisation or researcher
uses a different reference scale.8 In order to meet the
purpose of this article in the sense of placing the
Slovenian tax administration in a comparative
context, the IOTA categorisation focusing on tax
administrations and support for the taxpayers is
taken as a reference. FARS is also a member of
IOTA, although it has not provided either data for
the original analysis made in early April 2020
(Version 1.0) or the ﬁnal analysis of the ﬁrst wave
(Version 3.0 from 7 May 2020), so it is particularly
interesting to analyse its work in this context, too.
According to the IOTA categorisation in its ﬁnal
document, 63 reporting countries have convergently
(i.e. most of them at least one segment) adopted four
sets of measures, further divided into several submeasures. The main ones are: (1) measures
extending the deadlines for taxpayers, deferrals,
suspensions, lower penalties, etc., also including
various social beneﬁts to households and businesses

7
Germany is undoubtedly leading the way in the EU, not only in absolute terms, but also in terms of the relative share and timing of grants, loans and
investments. Slovenia is expected to allocate app. EUR 8 billion (in seven packages of measures) to provide aid and restart the economy, which is to be
ensured through the European Central Bank and from the euro stability mechanism, as well as domestic businesses and pension funds. According to the
Slovenian Government and its experts, direct state aid to the economy is expected to total about 5% of GDP, which is close to Germany's 7% of GDP
(approximately).
8
E.g. Sigma (2020) leans its analysis of public administration responses to COVID-19 on elements of good governance according to the Principles of Public
Administration (2017), which serve as requirements for candidate countries for full EU membership. They include policy co-ordination, public service &
HRM, accountability, service delivery, public ﬁnancial management, public procurement.
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(cf. OECD, 2020); (2) prompt refunds; (3) changes in
control and increased tax certainty; (4) customised
communication or services.
The same is true according to the OECD (2020)
analysis made in spring where around 70% of tax
reports highlighted (i) tax payment deferrals, while
about a third of the countries reported (ii) more
ﬂexible payment methods, (iii) extended application
and payment deadlines, and (iv) enhanced tax refunds, particularly for businesses rather than individuals. Evidently, all measures together provide
the basis for appropriate bridging effects, yet of
course, the countries differ considerably in speed of
response, method of adopting individual reliefs,
scope of support, duration, graduation of measures,
targeting of taxpayer groups, etc. This is another
reason for expecting quite different measurable effects of support, which is further emphasised if
countries opt for partial and non-analytically graduated measures (Damijan, 2020). In its May 2020
analysis of the measures taken by countries, the
OECD notes, among other things, that various phases of policy change must also be taken into account,
particularly immediate response and limiting the
damage, followed by recovery and resilience and
debt management. For the tax area, this means
providing liquidity, solvency and income support in
the ﬁrst part, and ﬁscal stimulus and (new) revenues
in the second. Therefore, a policy adaptation from
maintaining economic capacity to economic recovery
for businesses and households is expected in the
future. Lower tax revenues are in fact expected for a
few more years, due to both direct crisis effects and
intervention measures. The OECD thus expects new
measures differing by country and by individual
most affected sectors and social groups.
2.2 Analysis of adopted measures on FARS work by
legal basis and content
Slovenia ofﬁcially declared the epidemic on 12
March 2020 which, unlike in other countries, especially in the EU, coincided with the change of government on 13 March 2020 from a left-centre to a
right-wing government (Zagorc & Bardutzky, 2020).
As expected, the newly elected government adopted
the measures quickly and in a rather authoritative

way. Such an approach could indeed compare
Slovenia to for example Austria, considered exemplary by IOTA and an obvious role model for
Slovenia, but short-term analyses of the constitutional disputability of individual regulations, the
relative delays and only partial implementation of
the measures quickly showed that curbing COVID19 was a tough nut to crack. The Slovenian authorities seem to have responded with a mixed
approach. On the one hand, several eminent economists (known as the ‘Lahovnik Group’ led by
Professor of Economics and former Minister of the
Economy) were recruited from March 2020 on to
prepare measures for data-based and professional
decision-making. Moreover, a strategic council for
de-bureaucratisation of the tax, economic and
environmental ﬁelds led by former Director General
of the tax administration was established in May
2020. The government also cooperated with professional associations (e.g. Chamber of Commerce and
Industry, Chamber of Craft and Small Business) and
trade unions, especially in relation to the second
package of measures. On the other hand, measures
and regulations were supplemented and corrected
on a weekly basis and therefore at least partially
vaguely interpreted in terms of effect or validity
period and groups of beneﬁciaries.9
Between mid-March and 31 December 2020, seven
laws known as anti-corona packages (ACP; in
Slovenian PKP1ePKP7) were adopted. The ﬁrst one
was worth around EUR 2.8 billion, the second, third
and sixth ones around EUR 1 billion each, while the
fourth, ﬁfth and seventh approximately half a billion
each, in sum around EUR 8 billion (Government of
Slovenia, 2020). The impact assessment relates to
both direct payments and for example tax exemptions (which according to certain criteria should be
deﬁned as deferrals and vice versa). The anti-corona
packages were predominantly materia legis, regulating rights and obligations in relation to the authorities. Two laws are procedural as part of ACP1
and enacted in-between ACP6 and ACP7, i.e. Act
Determining Provisional Measures for Judicial,
Administrative and Other Public Matters to Cope
with the Spread of SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19)
(OGRS, No. 36/20, 61/20), and further Act Determining the Intervention Measures to Mitigate the

9
There was only one example outside the narrower tax area, which did not even seem economically justiﬁed (Damijan, 2020), namely one-off payments
to e.g. students and pensioners. As regards students, the law adopted in March 2020 granted them a one-off payment of EUR 150, but things got
complicated as it was unclear who exactly the beneﬁciaries were and what the procedure for granting such right was. Moreover, it was only in the second
half of April that the Ministry of Education developed an application for ﬁling the request for such payment, which was not even provided for in the law.
Anyway, a subsequent amendment to the law speciﬁed that the sole beneﬁciaries were full-time students enrolled in full-time study programmes, whereas
a new intervention law extended such right to part-time students as well.
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Consequences of the Second Wave of COVID-19
Epidemic (OGRS, No. 175/20), aimed at procedural
simpliﬁcations in general (not tax matters only).10 As
for the substantive law, all of these acts below relate
in particular to tax matters, of which, at least indirectly, the ﬁrst four adopted by July 2020 address the
ﬁrst COVID-19 wave and the other three from
October to December 2020 cover the second
COVID-19 wave:
1. Act Determining the Intervention Measures on
Salaries and Compensations (OGRS, No. 36/20,
49/20-ZIUZEOP,
61/20-ZIUZEOP-A,
80/20ZIUOOPE),11
2. Act Determining the Intervention Measures to
Contain the COVID-19 Epidemic and Mitigate
its Consequences for Citizens and the Economy
(OGRS, No. 49/20, 61/20, 152/20-ZZUOPP, 175/
20-ZIUPDVE),12
3. Act Determining the Intervention Measures to
Mitigate and Remedy the Consequences of the
COVID-19 Epidemic (OGRS, No. 80/20, 152/20ZZUOPP,
175/20-ZIUOPDVE,
203/20
e
ZIUPOPDVE),13
4. Act Determining Intervention Measures to Prepare for the Second Wave of COVID-19 (OGRS,
No. 98/20,152/20-ZZUOPP),14
5. Act Determining Temporary Measures to Mitigate and Remedy the Consequences of COVID19 (OGRS, No. 152/20,175/20-ZIUOPDVE),15
6. Act Determining Intervention Measures to Prepare for the Second Wave of COVID-19 (OGRS,
No. 175/20, 203/20 e ZIUPOPDVE),16
7. Act Determining Intervention Measures to
Assist in Mitigating the Consequences of the
Second Wave of COVID-19 Epidemic (OGRS,
No. 203/20).17
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The most recent intervention laws addressed in
tax issues especially VAT and social contributions
by the ACP6 in force by the end of 2020, with
possible governmental prolongation by 2022 enacting deferrals and instalments. Further, through the
ACP7 the tax exemptions of some special allowances granted to workers with lower pays were
enacted. At the same time, an amendment to the
TPA was tabled due to the COVID-19 interference
with the six-month deadlines to report on crossborder arrangements under DAC6,18 so that the ﬁrst
reporting or data exchange would take place in
January/February and April 2021 instead of July/
August and October 2020, respectively.
Under the above laws, FARS is designated as
either a direct provider (e.g. deferred deadlines in
tax proceedings) or indirectly as a controller (e.g.
when checking that the universal basic income
intended for entrepreneurs is not obtained by ineligible taxpayers). The mentioned legislation also
directly affected the FARS employees, as they
largelyeat least for a few weekseused the possibility of (forced) waiting for work at home. As regards
FARS activities, it will be eventually necessary to
take into account that according to the TPA, the tax
administration also performs procedures under
other regulations, in particular the recovery of
misdemeanour ﬁnes, many of which were issued by
health inspectors at the peak of the epidemic.19
The reported numbers of publication of the abovementioned laws in the national ofﬁcial gazette
demonstrate that in a relatively short time new laws
were adopted to correct previous laws, including
provisions related to tax matters and rather fundamental rights (cf. Nyamutata, 2020). Although this is
typical to a certain extent of almost all countries, the
Slovenian tax administration will need to take better
care in applying the relevant law in the right time.

10
In Slovenian: Zakon o zacasnih ukrepih v zvezi s sodnimi, upravnimi in drugimi javnopravnimi zadevami za obvladovanje sirjenja nalezljive bolezni SARS-CoV-2
COVID-19 (ZZUSUDJZ), http://www.pisrs.si/Pis.web/pregledPredpisa?id=ZAKO8183; Zakon o interventnih ukrepih za omilitev posledic drugega vala epidemije
COVID-19 (ZIUOPDVE), https://www.uradni-list.si/glasilo-uradni-list-rs/vsebina?urlurid¼20203096.
11
In Slovenian: Zakon o interventnih ukrepih na podrocju plac in prispevkov (ZIUPP), http://www.pisrs.si/Pis.web/pregledPredpisa?id¼ZAKO8181.
12
In Slovenian: Zakon o interventnih ukrepih za zajezitev epidemije COVID-19 in omilitev njenih posledic za drzavljane in gospodarstvo (ZIUZEOP), http://www.
pisrs.si/Pis.web/pregledPredpisa?id¼ZAKO8190.
13
In Slovenian: Zakon o interventnih ukrepih za omilitev in odpravo posledic epidemije COVID-19 (ZIUOOPE), http://pisrs.si/Pis.web/pregledPredpisa?
id¼ZAKO8206.
14
In Slovenian: Zakon o interventnih ukrepih za pripravo na drugi val COVID-19 (ZIUPDV), http://www.pisrs.si/Pis.web/pregledPredpisa?id¼ZAKO8231.
15
In Slovenian: Zakon o zacasnih ukrepih za omilitev in odpravo posledic COVID-19 (ZZUOOP), http://pisrs.si/Pis.web/pregledPredpisa?id¼ZAKO8254.
16
In Slovenian: Zakon o interventnih ukrepih za omilitev posledic drugega vala epidemije COVID-19 (ZIUOPDVE), http://www.pisrs.si/Pis.web/pregledPredpisa?
id¼ZAKO8272.
17
In Slovenian: Zakon o interventnih ukrepih za pomoc pri omilitvi posledic drugega vala epidemije COVID-19 (ZIUPOPDVE), https://www.uradni-list.si/glasilouradni-list-rs/vsebina/2020-01-3772?sop¼2020-01-3772.
18
Directive 2011/16/EU. Considering Council Directive (EU) 2020/876 of 24 June 2020 amending Directive 2011/16/EU, OJ, L 204/46, which represents a
rapid and coherent response within the EU and allows the Member States to defer, by its transposition into national law, certain time limits for the ﬁling
and exchange of information on reportable cross-border arrangements.
19
According to the Health Inspectorate, between March and May 2020 more than 6000 inspections were carried out in Slovenia and over 8000 proposals
for the imposition of ﬁnes were received from the Police. E.g. a few dozen ﬁnes were imposed in just two months for violations of the ban on the sale of
goods and services, and over 1200 ﬁnes for violations of the prohibition of movement. However, already in early October 2021 the Health Inspectorate
carried out over 47,000 inspections in this year, mostly issuing administrative measures and ﬁnes, the latter to be enforced by tax ofﬁces unless paid in due
time voluntarily.
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This is already a frequent controversy in Slovenian
administrative and judicial practice due to the principle of legitimate expectations (more in Kovac &
Kersevan, 2020, commentary to Article 6 of the
GAPA). However, the problem of legal (un)certainty
is increasing over time, mostly in the second
COVID-19 wave due to the autumn 2020 intervention laws (i.e. ACP5, ACP6 and ACP7). Some of these
laws revive earlier measures not in force in summer,
some prolong them even to 2022, some introduce
new and some modify previous beneﬁts, which
consequently leads to many confusions even among
accountants and specialised tax advisors.
In order to at least reduce the level of uncertainty,
FARS soon set up a website with a selection of
frequently asked questions and answers about
‘corona measures’ in the ﬁeld of taxation. The list is
frequently updated (e.g. over ten times in June 2020
only) to respond to the needs in practice and contains over 100 FAQs with app. 60 pages. In addition,
there are special explanatory notes published for
each of the ACPs adopted in autumn 2020, that is 22
pages with 65 questions and answers only for the
ACP7 from 31 December 2020, 24 pages with 47
questions regarding the ACP6, and 23 pages
regarding the ACP5). The most frequently questioned measures and dilemmas, particularly in the
ﬁrst wave, include:
 extension of deadlines for the submission of
tax returns, accounts and legal remedies,
payment of taxes and instalments, record
keeping and reporting, expiration and suspension of various material and procedural
deadlines,
especially
in
inspection
proceedings;
 reduction of the tax base and advance payments, (non)running of interests, amount and
type of exemption (e.g. VAT for the purchase
of protective equipment)20, tax deferrals, writeoffs and instalment payments and the procedure to claim such, particularly in case of
disease, quarantine or (self)isolation, waiting
for work, remote work or absence for caring
for children during kindergartens and schools
closure;

 measures related to wages, from deadlines for
submitting the necessary forms and exemptions from payment of pension and disability
insurance contribution (which is one of the
four mandatory contributions in Slovenia) for
work during the epidemic, to state aid, reimbursement of wage compensation during
temporary waiting for work, and partially
subsidised short-time work;
 eligibility and deadlines for payments and refunds, eligibility and procedure for obtaining
monthly or basic income, for example for sole
proprietors (EUR 700 per month in case of
reduction in business), or a one-off crisis
allowance21;
 duration of individual measures and application of transitional and ﬁnal provisions of
intervention laws.
A comparison of Slovenian measures according to
the IOTA and OECD categorisation is presented in
Table 1.
It can be concluded that, considering comparable
European countries, Slovenia adopted most of the
measures as a direct response to COVID-19 at the
level of laws, thus conﬁrming our H1 that Slovenia
adopted internationally comparable intervention
measures to curb COVID-19 at least normatively.
Namely, Table 1 reveals almost the same measures
for Slovenia as have been codiﬁed in other (European) countries, particularly procedural simpliﬁcations, deferrals and exemptions (see under 1). Yet
one can detect some signiﬁcant differences between
Slovenia and the exemplary EU member states
regarding the intensity of measures in the ﬁelds of
quick refunds and adjusted audits (2 and 3), however, these areas are mainly the result of slow
response of the regulator rather than unequal national laws by their content.
At the same time, it can be noticed that the
Slovenian tax administration responded relatively
quickly in implementing these laws, but generally
speaking its methods of work and thus rapid effects
were rather reactive than proactive, probably also
due to fear of non-compliance risks.22 On the other
hand, FARS systematically used the already

20
See also Commission Decision of 3 April 2020 on relief from import duties and VAT exemptions due to the COVID-19 outbreak. There were more
exemptions enacted with the intervention laws in the second COVID-19 wave.
21
Moreover, with the ACPs adopted in autumn and winter 2020 other measures were enforced, such as more one-time or even monthly allowances for
employees with lover income (EUR 200), pensioners (up to EUR 300), students (EUR 150), church workers (EUR 700), etc.
22
E.g. if the application had been ﬁled in mid-April, the ﬁrst payment of the basic income for March 2020 for the self-employed was made on 25 April; if
the application had been ﬁled between 19 and 30 April, the payment for March or April was made only on 10 May 2020; if the application had been ﬁled in
May, the payment was made on 10 June 2020. This is noticeably longer than in several comparable countries. Moreover, users reported that ﬁlling out the
applications (via the eDavki system) was not easy. According to economists, a rapid delivery of support was critical particularly in the ﬁrst weeks, including
cutting red tape and using new technologies for businesses and households alike (Marron & Makiw and OECD, 2020). On the other hand, especially from
an economic point of view, also the taxpayers must seek balance between the beneﬁt of the aid and the burden of its receipt, especially as aid always means
more ex-post controls.
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Efﬁcient regulation & practice (mostly from
before COVID-19)

Comparable normatively and in practice

Slovenia e
measures

authors'

assessment

of

established good practices of digitalisation of procedures. In the ﬁrst months mostly affected by the
pandemic, i.e. April and May 2020, FARS collected
about 40% less taxes each month than in the same
period in 2019: in May, a total of EUR 861.3 million
were collected, which is EUR 572.4 million less than
in the same month last year. In July and August
2020, FARS collected more taxes than in 2019 (EUR
173.9 million), the next small drop started in
September (EUR 0.3 million), while in October and
November the drop was larger (EUR 71.2 million).
The taxes that fell the most were taxes on proﬁt and
income, also due to exemptions from certain tax
advances.

Tackled, but not a priority, questionable
beneﬁciaries
Immediately rather no and later low
attention
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Source: IOTA (2020); OECD (2020).

4

3

Enhanced services & communication

Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, Latvia,
Lithuania, Romania
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Spain,
Sweden
Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary,
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta,
Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden
2

Additional timing, extensions, deferrals,
remitting penalties …
& social support (e.g. waiving/delaying/
budget paid social
contributions, family support)
Quicker refunds to taxpayers & social
transfers
Temporary adjusted audit policy and
quicker tax certainty
1

Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland,
the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden

Measures e groups by IOTA & OECD
(2020)
No.

- extension of deadlines for submission of annual
corporate income tax (CIT) and personal income
tax returns for income from activities,
- a simpliﬁed procedure for applying for a
reduction in advances for the two taxes in
question,
- non-payment of the advance payment instalment for April and May for both taxes,
- exemption from the payment of social security
contributions for self-employed persons who
were unable to perform their activities or who
performed them to a signiﬁcantly lower extent,
- deferral of the payment of social security contributions for self-employed persons during the
epidemic until March 2022,
- exemption from the payment of pension and
disability insurance contributions for employees
who worked during the epidemic,
- exemption from the payment of VAT on protective equipment intended for certain
institutions,
- a 100% relief on donations to a special fund
opened by the state to mitigate the consequences of the epidemic,

Table 1. Comparison of anti-corona tax measures in Slovenia according to IOTA & OECD.

A closer look at tax-related measures shows a
more detailed picture of whether the measures have
the effect of reducing the tax liability, exemption or
deferral and, consequently, an impact on budget
revenues. As already presented in the previous
section, the measures can be classiﬁed into different
groups (Table 1 shows the basic four groups). In
order to compare the measures more easily, the ﬁrst
group is analysed in more detail below.
The direct and indirect intervention tax measures
in Slovenia include:

Selected exemplary EU countries

2.3 Comparison of intervention measures in
Slovenia by impact on tax liability
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Source: IOTA (2020); OECD (2020).

Upon the request of the taxpayer: Finland, Luxemburg
Hungary, Slovakia: for speciﬁc sectors and businesses;
Spain (differently for small and large businesses)

Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Spain, France,
Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Luxemburg, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, the Netherlands
Belgium, Poland (0%), Portugal
Greece: reduced rate for speciﬁc products
Poland (higher %)
Sweden, Luxemburg, Germany, Greece, Belgium and other countries that paid basic income: for speciﬁc employment
related allowances or for the crisis allowance

Similar

Austria, Belgium, Slovakia
Greece, Sweden, Poland, Malta

Extension of deadlines for ﬁling tax returns
Exemption from the payment of social security
contributions for the self-employed or part
of the contributions for workers
Deferral of payment of taxes (not just social
security contributions)
VAT exemption
Tax reliefs on donations
Lower tax base in personal income tax

EU countries that introduced a (non)
similar measure (examples)
Type of measure

Table 2. Comparison of tax measures among selected countries.

As regards the above measures, it can be
concluded that, except for the exemptions, they do
not imply a reduction of tax liabilities. The intervention measures did not interfere with systemic
provisions and did not signiﬁcantly change the tax
legislation, as they temporarily determine only nontaxable income and exemptions from some liabilities for a certain period of time. However, some of
the measures implied changes of procedural provisions, as they introduced simpliﬁed or automatic
exercise of certain rights, which also required some
modiﬁcations in the work of FARS that had to adjust
the information system and the 'abbreviations' of the
taxpayers.
In addition to the measures mentioned above,
state aid in the form of subsidising short-time work
and reimbursement of wage compensation to
workers temporary waiting for work, which are not
directly tax measures but indeed have budgetary
implications, was also largely used in Slovenia.
Other similar measures included the payment of
basic income for self-employed persons who had no
revenues during the epidemic, a tax-free crisis
allowance for workers (under a certain amount of
wage) who worked during the epidemic, and taxfree crisis allowances for pensioners and students.
Such temporary allowances were exempt from the
payment of personal income tax and can be regarded as a kind of indirect tax measure. Also important for the economy was the measure that provided
for shorter deadlines for payments by the state for
purchases and services, which was only seldom
implemented in practice, as well as several measures related to loan guarantees.
It can be concluded that most of the measures
relating to taxation followed those taken by other
countries. The ﬁrst OECD analysis (2020) showed
that 70% of OECD countries introduced tax deferrals, 30% allowed the extension of deadlines for
the payment of tax liabilities, ﬂexibility in paying off
tax debt and faster tax refunds, over 20% reduced
liabilities arising from the payment of social security
contributions, and less than 10% reduced other tax
liabilities. Beneﬁciaries of the measures also varied
from country to country. For the most part, speciﬁc
sectors or businesses whose turnover decreased by
a certain share were eligible for the measures. Only
rarely were the measures intended for all businesses. Lowering tax rates, i.e. reducing tax liabilities, was a less common practice. In Europe, VAT
was temporarily reduced only in Norway and
Cyprus; otherwise, it was mainly reduced in some

Different

- reduction of the base of personal income tax
arising from cadastral income.
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countries in Asia and Africa. Few countries reduced
CIT and personal income tax rates. Table 2 provides
a comparison of selected countries.
Most EU Member States used similar measures,
which indirectly related to tax liabilities or improved
the liquidity of the economy, but these are not the
subject of this article and hence no comparisons
thereof are made. The above comparison conﬁrms
the part of H2 that relates to the type of measures. In
Slovenia, too, most of the measures related to the
deferral of tax liabilities and extension of the deadlines for the payment of certain liabilities. These
were followed by measures related to exemptions
and reductions in tax liabilities.
Although studies by various organisations and
individual countries show that the consequences for
the economy will be signiﬁcantly worse than those
caused by the ﬁnancial crisis about a decade ago, a
quick comparison of tax measures shows that current measures are signiﬁcantly different from the
ones applied during the ﬁnancial crisis. However,
this certainly does not mean that such measures will
not follow, as systemic measures will also need to be
developed for the economy to recover once the
consequences are clearer and quantiﬁed. During the
ﬁnancial crisis, tax reforms led mainly to an increase
of the tax burden, as most countries increased VAT
rates and the maximum marginal income tax rates.
There were several changes in property taxation as
well. In terms of corporate income taxation, the
measures varied, as both an increase and a decrease
in CIT rates were observed. Such measures in fact
require major changes in the functioning of the
system and the tax administration, and more
detailed analyses of the effects thereof are needed.
The fact is that most intervention measures in
Slovenia, as well as in other countries during the
pandemic, were adopted very quickly, with a short
response time to implementation. It thus makes
sense, not only for the implementation of the laws
but also for the control over such, to apply as few
exceptions as possible to these measures and to
identify the different positions of the taxpayers. In
these cases, the stabilisation function prevails over
the distributive one, although the latter is also
partially favoured by determining the circle of
beneﬁciaries. From the point of view of the functioning of the tax administration, such an approach
is indeed the most desirable, as it requires less adjustments and IT changes. The system is also more
manageable from the viewpoint of the beneﬁciaries
addressed by the measures. Notwithstanding the
above, the rapid adoption of legislation also has
certain undesirable consequences, which are presented in more detail below.
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2.4 Effects of tax intervention measures on the
national budget
The initial analyses of various countries around
the world show that the epidemic had three crucial
effects on national budgets: a reduction in
budgetary inﬂows by more than 20% or up to 5% of
GDP on average and an increase in budgetary
transfers to individuals and businesses in various
forms, reaching on average 5%e30% of a country's
GDP (OECD, 2020). According to the government's
data on the measures taken, over EUR 3 billion were
planned for direct payments or exemptions already
in spring 2020, which accounts for more than 6% of
Slovenia's GDP in 2019. Some experts even estimate
that Slovenia will spend around 5% of GDP on the
implementation of all the packages adopted. Businesses were expected to receive the largest share of
aid, namely already by the ﬁrst four ACPs (laws
adopted from spring to summer 2020) EUR 2.4
billion, the self-employed EUR 210 million, farmers
EUR 130 million, and other groups at risk (pensioners, students, socially disadvantaged persons)
over EUR 145 million, while part of the funds is also
intended for the public sector and others. Most of
the aid was prolonged also in the last three ACPs. In
the last three ACPs some of the subventions are
higher for those who did not receive the limited
amount of state aid, some subventions are new (i.e.
coverage of ﬁxed costs for businesses affected by
measures). The actual direct effects will only be
assessed after the measures have expired, when it
will be clear how many beneﬁciaries have actually
applied for direct payments. Initial data after the
end of the ﬁrst wave showed that more than 40% of
beneﬁciaries applied for basic income, in a total
value of over EUR 83 million. Payments to employers to compensate for the wages of workers
waiting for work reached just under EUR 158
million by the end of June and covered more than
170,000 workers. According to data, by the end of
November 2020 businesses received EUR 333.6
million from the ﬁrst six ACPs only for subsidies
connected to employees (waiting for work, quarantine, short-time work, ﬁnancial support). As the
measure has been extended with other ACPs, the
total amount of the funds is still unknown. Payments to other groups (pensioners, students, recipients of social assistance) amounted to over EUR
80 million already in the ﬁrst wave. Direct payments
are therefore currently lower than expected, with
just under EUR 350 million being paid by July 2020.
Some measures have been completed, while some
are still being implemented or renewed from spring
to winter 2020 and on. The real growth of GDP for
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the third quarter of 2020 in comparison to the same
period in 2019 shows 2.6%.
According to the estimation made by the Fiscal
Council, till the end of June a total of EUR 1.1 billion
have been spent from public sources. These direct
payments do not include exemptions (social security
contributions, VAT), which reﬂect in lower budget
revenues. The report on collected taxes and other
duties from June 2020 published by FARS in midJuly shows that 19.8% less duties were collected than
in the same period last year, while the situation
changed by the end of November 2020, since 7.5%
less duties were collected by FARS than in the same
period in 2019. In consolidated budget, the drop is
around 5.9% of all tax revenues. The biggest drop
was recorded in May, as the inﬂow was lower by
almost 40% compared to May 2019. The heaviest fall
was recorded in social security contributions, which
was expected as intervention measures largely
focused on exemptions from this type of duties. The
decrease in payments was more than 40%. Such
decline in budgetary inﬂows was followed by a drop
in tax revenues from wages (by more than 25%),
while the mildest fall was recorded in VAT inﬂows,
i.e. by just under 11%, which even improved slightly
in June and further months. A comparison of semiannual inﬂows between 2019 and 2020 for the ﬁrst six
months shows a decline in tax revenues by 13.4% in
2020, and by the end of November 2020 by 7.5%. In
the second half of the year 2020 (till the end of
November), the largest drop is observed regarding
corporate income tax (by 24.2%), followed by a
drop in excise duties and VAT (by 9.8%). The above
data suggest that the expected values of the measures are unlikely to be fully achieved. Although
the redemption of ‘tourist vouchers’ is not a direct
tax measure, it can be noted from the dynamics of
their use that they will indeed bring indirect tax
effectsethe redemption of vouchers causes synergies in the consumption of other accompanying
tourist products and their effect will only be seen
next year. In any case, it can be concluded that the
payments for the redemption of vouchers represent a minor net burden on the budget. According
to the latest published data, over 833,000 vouchers
out of roughly 2 million worth a total of almost
EUR 114 million were used between June and early
October 2020.
Relatively speaking, the measures are comparable
to those adopted in other countries. Some data (e.g.
Bruegel datasets, Mazars’ COVID-19 global tax and
law tracker, OECD, IOTA) show especially for the
ﬁrst COVID-19 wave an even higher share of aid

relative to GDP as the estimates of some direct ﬁscal
measures in selected countries range between 0.4%
(Hungary) and 13.3% (Germany). Higher percentages are foreseen for deferral measures, while the
highest shares are anticipated for other liquidity and
guarantee schemes (Anderson et al., 2020; Mazars,
2020; OECD, 2020). Given the current dynamics in
Slovenia, we can also conﬁrm this part of H2,
namely that the measures are comparable with
other countries also in terms of value. These are, of
course, current estimates, which we will not be able
to evaluate until the next few years. Together with
the comparisons of measures, we can conﬁrm that
types of the tax intervention measures in Slovenia
are comparable to those in other countries. Slovenia
actually mostly followed measures in other countries, especially those in EU and implemented the
same as most of other EU Member States. In evaluating the scope of measures, measures directly
connected to taxation reached the goal since
liquidity of the businesses was addressed. The
major inﬂuence of the most of ﬁnancial measures
connected to businesses will have inﬂuence on
taxation, and can therefore be treated as indirect tax
measures. Since the drop in tax revenues in the
second half of 2020 is lower than in the ﬁrst wave,
inﬂuence is already detected. The scope of the
measures is to prevent businesses from closing
down and to prevent unemployment as well. According to the Slovenian Business Register, the
highest number of companies was closed in April
2020 (more than 2000) and was far larger than the
number of new established companies (around 600)
in the same month. The situation in the second wave
is better since the number of the new established
companies was above the number of closed ones
with the exception in November 2020, when 300
more companies were closed than established.
Similar situation is with the number of selfemployed entrepreneurs, where the number of
closed was above the new registered in the period
from March to May 2020, since the new registered is
higher from closed ones from June 2020. Statistics
show that the total number of the new established
self-employers in year 2020 is higher than closed for
approximately 1.4 thousand. In analysing unemployment data, we can observe the highest number
in May 2020, which was decreasing till October 2020.
In the last two months of the year 2020, the number
increased again but did not reach the number from
May 2020. Numbers are far below the numbers
in ﬁnancial crisis during the year 2014. The
similar unemployment development can be seen in
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other EU Member states, while statistics on new
businesses is not available yet for the whole EU. We
can make the same conclusion also for that part of
H2, in which both scope and inﬂuence of the measures are comparable according to some macroeconomic indicators.

3 Discussion on the measures and FARS’ work
during the corona crisis
3.1 Normative and implementation aspects of
intervention measures in taxation
The coronavirus crisis called for an immediate
response, i.e. fast adoption of laws intended to
preserve jobs and liquidity, help the most affected
industries, etc. In doing so, countries faced a lack of
situation-speciﬁc comparative practices. The only
reference was the global economic crisis or, for
Eastern European countries, the change in the systems thirty years ago, which involved major market
losses and tax consequences. Yet although radical,
those changes were not as sudden as in the case of
COVID-19. It is therefore not surprising that the
aforementioned anti-corona approaches by the
Slovenian government, with ad hoc regulations and
an authoritarian stance, led to a relatively controversial legal and economic situation during the
COVID-19 epidemic, when the government acted as
a “sole initiator of acts falling with all powers”
(Zagorc & Bardutzky, 2020).23 At ﬁrst glance, one can
also conclude that the principles of the intervention
measures, such as temporality and proportionality
(according to Martinek, 2018; cf. Sigma, 2020; Nyamutata, 2020), were not fully respected, either in
Slovenia or, comparatively, in the neighbouring
countries.
Problems at the regulatory level, i.e. regulationsdriven public policy making, always reﬂect in their
implementation, for example in delayed action of
executive administrative authorities, which is
burdened with procedural requirements and
therefore possibly arbitrary. For example, one of the
ﬁrst intervention laws suspending the deadlines in
non-urgent matters, where urgency was ex lege
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deﬁned by each individual body, came into effect
already in late March 2020. FARS deﬁned all regular
tax assessments as urgent, posting a notice on its
website on 20 March 202024 where it stated: “since
the operation of state bodies or bodies of self-governing local communities depends on tax revenues,
tax assessment is considered an urgent matteretherefore, procedural deadlines and the deadlines
for meeting the liabilities are not suspended”.
However, regardless of the disputability of individual cases,25 the risk rate of the taxpayers or the value
of tax, it did not deﬁne as urgent either ex-post tax
control (inspection) or various tax refunds (VAT,
excise duties, etc.), which could ensure the much
needed liquidity for many businesses. At the same
time, towards the end of the ofﬁcially declared
epidemic, measures were taken the effects of which
were questionable in both economic and legal
terms, but allegedly politically pleasing. Quite some
controversies arose with regard to tourist vouchersethe citizens of Slovenia received tourist
vouchers of EUR 200 per adult and EUR 50 per
minor to be redeemed between June 2020 and
December 2021. FARS plays a major role therein, as
it manages the entire system of voucher redemption
at tourist facilities and the payments made thereto,
while at the same time solving legal dilemmas about
beneﬁciaries of the vouchers, the transfer and the
partial redemption thereof, etc.
In implementing the rapidly adopted and changing intervention laws that involve tax measures,
FARS is indeed trying to act up-to-date and legitimately. For example, it closely pursues traceability
and allows comparisons of the various versions of
frequently asked questions and answers by date of
release on its websites (FARS, 2020), which is
certainly a welcome stance. On the contrary, the
very need for such extensive and constantly
changing explanations represents a gap that, despite
the declared epidemic, is indeed a problem for a
state governed by the rule of law, as the resolution
of open issues is likely to last a long time and take
place even in courts. In terms of content, most open
issues involving CIT and personal income tax seem
to be related to income from business activities and

23
Among other things, there were political pressures on the upper chamber of parliament to give up its veto power, referendum initiatives to enforce laws
immediately after adoption (instead of the usual minimum 15 days), as well as non-intervention provisions being included in intervention laws (e.g.
provisions on restricting accessory participants in proceedings). Therefore, it is not surprising that over 50 regulations were submitted to the Constitutional
Court of the Republic of Slovenia for the assessment of constitutionality or legality between March and June 2020 alone. A considerable share thereof was
challenged also due to the allegedly excessive discretion of the Executive in relation to unclear laws, or because rights and obligations were determined in
implementing regulations where taxation requires particularly important restrictions (cf. Pistone, 2020; Avbelj, 2019).
24
With a notice on the website https://www.gov.si/novice/2020-03-20-ukrepi-na-davcnem-podrocju-za-blazitev-posledic-koronavirusa, although the law
requires individual notiﬁcations in every act issued by FARS to the taxpayer. More on this and on the amendments to this Act in late April in Kovac &
Kersevan, 2020.
25
Usually, according to Compliance Risk Management (on CRM more in OECD, 2020), measures are differentiated by proﬁle and status of the taxpayer,
thus distinguishing between tax fraud, tax evasion, and tax avoidance.
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social security contributions for the self-employed,
farmers and similar taxpayers. This is understandable given the structure of taxpayers in Slovenia. As
small taxpayers, they are subject to these charges in
particular, while at the same time being aware that
the burden of claiming aid exceeds the aid itself or
that they do not have the necessary tax skills. The
latter seems to be a problem as many dilemmas
relate to the ordinary TPA rules (e.g. on non/possibility of tax write-off)26 rather than intervention
laws. In almost all types of dilemmas, there is usually an intertwining of substantive and procedural
norms, as often for example deferral also involves
other bases or the taxpayer's status, which is
particularly risky for the equality before the law and
legal certainty.
At the same time, this points to the importance of
procedural law that actually enables the exercise of
substantive legal rights (more on this in Nykiel &
Sek, 2009; Pistone, 2020). In this context, proactive
action by FARS is important, which is often somewhat slow and complicated, but nevertheless systematically directed and provided with information
support. As regards procedures, the fact is that
under the TPA and in terms of FARS work, they are
neither friendly nor fast, as already the legislature
provided for relatively demanding fact-ﬁnding
procedure and taking of evidence, leading to
possible tax avoidance. In times of crisis, this can be
an additional problem, as those who need help the
most do not know how to start the procedure or
obtain the rights relatively late. From the point of
view of legal certainty, criticism was expressed also
in relation to the legally provided ex-post sanctioning of beneﬁciaries if they operate more successfully in the following months than anticipated in
the critical epidemic months. However, the possibility of ﬁling tax return based on voluntary disclosure under the TPA (Art. 55, 63, 140a) solves the
possible problem, as the taxpayers are excluded
from misdemeanour liability even if they opt for
voluntary disclosure during the actual inspection.
The analysis of measures that already expired (e.g.
waiting for work in the past months) showseas of
year 2020ethat noticeably less funds were used than
initially planned, in some cases only about a third (!).
This is the result of several factors, from lack of a

rapid response to the health and economic crisis to
unclear norms, disregarded loss of income of the
economic operators in some sectors, reluctance of
banks, businesses, employers and employees to
taking advantage of aid, unexpectedly high volume
of remote working, a partly too bureaucratic system
of access to aid compared to some other countries,
avoidance of consequent control by taxpayers (more
Damijan, 2020; cf. OECD, 2020). In such context,
emphasis is to be placed on the importance of legal
certainty in tax matters or (in)stability of tax regulations, whichein addition to the tax burden or formalisation of procedureseis generally the main
factor of taxpayers’ (dis)satisfaction with the system
(Klun & Jovanovic, 2016). Therefore, based on previous economic analyses, more attention should be
paid in future regulation to normative predictability
and clarity and equality between similar taxpayers,27
even if this means that some measures will be taken a
month or so later than usual. Moreover, as pointed
out by international analyses and expert studies, the
tax policy will need to includeegenerally and
because of COVID-19emore cooperation with
stakeholders, innovative and alternative approaches
in tax procedures, and digitalisation (Kovac, 2018;
Pistone, 2020; Steen & Brandsen, 2020; Sigma, 2020;
OECD, 2020).
A positive lesson for the period during and after
COVID-19ein Slovenia even more than in other
countriesewas the simpliﬁed e-communication between the tax administration and the users. Between
March and June 2020, and further from late
November 2020 to ﬁrst months of 2021, requests
were ﬁled and service was effected in a simpliﬁed
manner. As no misuses were recorded, such kind of
solutions could well become more permanent (a
similar assessment was given for the entire public
administration by Sigma, 2020). Yet only good will
and open proceedings by FARS do not sufﬁce;
instead, a combination of normative and operational
activities is needed. A good example in this direction is the coming into force of the Act Determining
Provisional Measures for Judicial, Administrative and Other Public Matters to Cope with the
Spread of SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19) at the end of
March 2020, which suspended deadlines in nonurgent matters, simpliﬁed the ﬁling of applications,

26
It should be noted at this point that the Slovenian TPA with over 400 articles regulates a number of possible taxpayers' bonuses, as in writing this law the
need for a balance between public revenues and taxpayers' rights was constantly kept in mind and care was taken that the costs of procedure do not exceed
the gain (Jerovsek et al., 2008). In such regard, the TPA was signiﬁcantly supplemented between its adoption in 2006 and the years of the global economic
crisis, in order to provide taxpayers with a number of bonuses, e.g. ﬁling tax return on the basis of voluntary disclosure, several forms of instalment and
deferred payment of tax, or various insurance options.
27
Nyamutata (2020) points out in such regard the ‘rights-based approach’, founded on human rights protected in international human rights treaties.
However, in the haste to contain a rapidly spreading pandemic, human rights are potentially vulnerable to violations, and even states with deep-rooted
democratic cultures resort to illiberal responses, which can lead to more permanent authoritarian regimes.
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introduced videoconferences and e-service, thus
further upgrading the already fairly functioning eoperations based on the TPA and the eDavki system
(eTaxes). Nevertheless, the Act proved to be too
demanding (more in Kovac & Kersevan, 2020) and at
the end of April 2020, it was amended with further
simpliﬁcations regarding the omission of qualiﬁed
veriﬁcation of the identity of clients and ﬁctions of
service. On the other hand, the new similar law
adopted in November 2020 (ZIUOPDVE or the so
called ACP6) offered a more continuous solution for
any similar crisis with simpliﬁcations introduced by
a governmental ordinance for three to six months.
Intervention laws in general can be an opportunity
for experimental and innovative solutions (Martinek, 2018), although in a constitutional democracy it
is imperative to proceed from a uniform general
regulation according to GAPA (deviations are only
allowed if there is justiﬁed reason to differentiate
considering equal constitutional protection of rights;
cf. Avbelj, 2019, commentary to Article 22 of the
Constitution) and to ensure ex ante and ex post
parliamentary and especially judicial oversight over
government acts or the discretion of the Executive.
Contrary, a permanent arrangement of this kind
could encourage taxpayers to various circumventions, which they failed to think of in a few months
or which would not pay off at the time being. In any
case, these two acts proved to be a well-functioning
mechanism, as it regulated administrative and
judicial procedures almost uniformly. Likewise, its
implementation in practice did not cause major
problems for FARS or taxpayers.
Below the line, one can see that the Slovenian
list of laws mostly coincides with the categorisation
of measures according to IOTA and OECD. However, given the diversity of interpretations, all
groups of tax measures are obviously quickly
written and therefore sometimes ill-considered,
which might lead to insufﬁciently simple and timeconsuming aid procedures when compared to the
exemplary Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian countries. Therefore, the initial H1 on the international
comparability of Slovenian measures can be
conﬁrmed as predominantly veriﬁed since Slovenia
has adopted very similar if not the same intervention laws as other countries in the EU, albeit in
some elements in a less thoughtful and systemic way than for example Germany or Austria
(Damijan, 2020).
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3.2 Assessment of the Slovenian tax administration
in terms of agility and coproduction
The assessment of the work of the (Slovenian) tax
administration below is based on the selected
theoretical models that emphasise responsiveness
and sustainability, as the coronavirus crisis will
cause at least uncertainty and the need for public
law measures for some time to come. Due to the
relatedness of the principles of good public governance (Sigma, 2020), as well as the speciﬁcs of tax
matters (such as coercion and the provision of most
public funds for public beneﬁt), the most suitable
concepts seem to be agility and co-production in the
formulation and implementation of public
(including tax) policies. These two concepts also
emphasise the importance of participation or cooperation of various stakeholders, typical of tax procedures in the light of the objective of tax collection
(Kovac, 2018; Pistone, 2020).
The concept of agility seems ideal for the analysis
of crisis measures, especially if they are to have
lasting effects or establish themselves as a ‘new
normality’. Agility in fact means “responding to
changing public needs in an efﬁcient way” (Mergel
et al., 2020), whether it involves a radical redesign or
for example (only) digitisation of public services. It
needs to be underlined that agility is not only a
property of private organisations, but also a litmus
test for the public sphere to reﬂect on its importance
and accountability in relation to the public and
speciﬁc users (e.g. taxpayers). Namely it is not in
conﬂict with democratic or classical administrative
values (Greve et al., 2019), although it is antithetical
to typical bureaucratic line organizations and requires a new form of leadership (Mergel et al., 2020).
Looking at the 12 basic principles of agility (according to Beck et al., 2001) as the basis for assessing
the work of Slovenian regulatory authorities and
FARS during the coronavirus crisis, one can ﬁndein
accordance with the above observationsethat the
match is only partial,28 with a bigger gap at the
regulator than at FARS (see Table 3).
One can see that the elements of participation as
a basis for co-production are only partially fulﬁllederelatively poorly and narrowly especially at the
normative level, and a little more in the implementation of tax procedures. This is contrary to the
ﬁnding that in terms of health measures the
COVID-19 era marked a kind of golden age of co-

28
This is a subjective author's assessment, but it is based on the above mentioned measures, assessments and data, where in particular two levels of the
scale were used: (a) ‘mostly’ for the predominant observance of an individual principle and (b) ‘partially’ for only partial observance of agility guidelines.
The ratings are separate for the level of regulation and level of implementation. In implementation, the regulatory level can be either loosened in terms of
formal requirements or even tightened.
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Table 3. Anti-coronavirus tax measures in Slovenia by the principles of agility.
No.

Principles of agility (Beck et al., 2001; Mergel et al., 2020)

Parliament/Government regulator

Tax administration implementer

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Fulﬁl the customers' needs (early, by IT)
Respond to the demand for changes
Shorten the timescale for delivery
Work hand in hand with users
Centre fabrication around motivated individuals
Emphasise face-to-face team conversation
Benchmark through working solutions
Aim for sustainable development
Focus on technical quality & good design
Emphasise simplicity
Self-organisation in teams
Regularly reﬂect on improvements

Partially
Mostly
Mostly
Partially
No evidence
Partially
Partially
Partially
Partially
Mostly
No evidence
Partially

Mostly
Mostly
Mostly
Mostly
Partially
Partially
Partially
Partially
Partially
Mostly
Partially
Partially

production, as citizens massively and voluntarily
chose to cooperate (Steen & Brandsen, 2020). This
was pointed out also by the Slovenian Prime Minister in mid-May 2020, saying that otherwise
Slovenia could not be the ﬁrst country to declare
the epidemic over. However, the situation is rather
opposite when assessing the second wave and the
measures in autumn and winter of 2021 since the
continued governmental redeﬁnitions of measures
together with almost no decreasing ﬁgures of
affected people cannot be attributed to the COVID19 related uncertainty, as justiﬁable in the ﬁrst
wave. Nevertheless, despite the general yearning
for strong leadership, the more decentralised systems of public services delivered more effectively
(Steen & Brandsen, 2020). This statement matches
the effects identiﬁed above, which had already
been an established practice in Slovenia before
COVID-19, such as the eDavki system (eTaxes),
which at the same time ensures sustainability
beyond the immediate crisis. The same is
conﬁrmed through IOTA activities, such as the
Forum on Communication that was held in
November 2020 with participants from 32 countries
who focused on the development and exchange of
innovative initiatives and responses of tax administrations’ communication strategies that were
implemented during the COVID-19 crisis, as well
as the changes and future implications of these
(IOTA, 2020).
Therefore, the regulatory measures of Slovenia
are comparable by their content to the majority of
other countries while there waseand further existsea major gap in quickness of the response. Yet, the
latter can hardly be attributed to the Slovenian tax
administration provided its systemic agility, especially through the comprehensive explanatory notes
and highly developed digitalised operations. Hence,
the accountability regarding the lack of appropriately swift coverage of the crisis circumstances in

Slovenia as opposed to other countries lies with the
regulator and the overall administrative system not
adjusted to the resilient response to a major crisis.
Our hypothesis (H1) on the normative similarity of
intervention measures in Slovenia in relation to the
ones adopted in other EU member states is under
the line conﬁrmed as regards the types of measures
set by the anti-corona packages (e.g. tax deferrals
and exemptions with social assistance). Nevertheless, this is not the case as regards taking care of
timely effects thereof to support taxpayers in due
time. In the future, Slovenia will have to understand
primarily at the regulatory level, which can be done
through co-governance, that not only the content
but also the timing of measures matters when
intervening to limit the crisis.
According to theory (see Ostrom, 1996), however,
there are certain conditions to be met for co-production of public services, and all the more so in tax
relations. The ﬁrst one is an appropriate legislative
framework to support co-production, the existence
of which can partially be established in Slovenia,
considering the provisions of the TPA, the possibilities given to the taxpayers with intervention
laws, and the cooperation of experts and professional associations with the government. Secondly,
it is necessary to provide a complementary and not
merely substitutive contribution of professionals
and citizen co-producers, yet in Slovenia these
characteristics are poorly traced in tax matters (cf.
Kovac, 2018). Thirdly, mutual commitment and incentives directed towards encouraging co-production are important, together with appropriate
relationships between roles, rights and responsibilities of the relevant actors (Steen &
Brandsen, 2020). Slovenia is quite reserved in such
regard with its understanding of the Rechtsstaat
legacy, and especially in a crisis insists on classical
authoritarian relations (more Kovac & Kersevan,
2020). In summary, history teaches us that it is easy
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to do ‘business as usual’ when the crisis is over,
although it is not ideal and the crisis experience
could be used as an added value for the usual
business. This requires the establishment of systemic conditions for all social stakeholders, with the
government at the forefront, based on the constitutional principles of democratic governance (Sigma,
2020; Zagorc & Bardutzky, 2020).

4 Conclusions
The role of the tax administration in providing
public funds is crucial in every country. This is and
will be all the truer in times of crisis, such as the
COVID-19 pandemic, and even more so in the
subsequent reboot and bridging of the economic
downturn resulting therefrom. Despite the symmetrical shock, at least in the EU, individual countries responded and continue to respond differently
to the pandemic, whether at the normative or
implementation level. In any case, the legal-systemic and macroeconomic aspects must be taken
into account when designing and implementing
intervention measures in the ﬁeld of taxation, as
taxes certainly represent a multidisciplinary issue.
This means that tax policy and the work of the tax
administration must be addressed with a broader
approach, as required by complex ‘wicked’ social
problems, which is also shown by this analysis.
Considering the hypotheses set out in the introduction, it can be concluded that in connection with
the work of FARS, Slovenia adopted measures that
are in principle comparable to those in other
countries. In their implementation, FARS cannot be
blamed for the systemic lack of agility and co-productive orientation when these phenomena are
found. However, there is at least a partially questionable sequence and deﬁnition of measures at the
level of the government and parliament, causing
difﬁculties in the implementation for the tax
administration and a reserved stance by other
stakeholders and beneﬁciaries. The comparative
analysis of the measures taken in the ﬁeld of taxation is therefore comparable not only in terms of the
group of measures, but also in terms of the type of
measure and its weight in ﬁnancial terms. It is worth
emphasising in such regard that in terms of implementation, Slovenia was technically even more
efﬁcient than most countries in the ﬁrst wave thanks
to the rapid adjustment of the existing information
support, which is true for most procedures related
to anti-coronavirus measures and not only for procedures conducted by FARS. However, FARS had
to adopt most of the changes and adjustments
practically overnight, so its role in the
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implementation thereof was and still is crucial. In
particular, in parallel with the establishment of
support, FARS prepared simple explanations for
beneﬁciaries and even categorised instructions according to life events in order to increase
transparency.
In the future, more attention should be paid to exante legal and economic reﬂection and deﬁnition of
approaches based on past experience, comparative
examples and information on what measures are
being taken and to what extent. Namely, the common goal is undoubtedly to achieve that the activities
of the tax administration have an optimal effect both
on the provision of public funds for the operation of
the state and society and on ensuring the protection
of the rights of individual (groups) of taxpayers. Such
a balanced approach is not only an ideal of good (tax)
administration in times of crisis, but a necessity.
Therefore, the experience obtained during the
COVID-19 period should be used as lesson learned
for future better responses to tax emergencies and
the usual business alike. The implementation of the
measures revealed yet another shortcoming of the
society. Namely, although mostly clear and transparent, the search for information by the majority of
the interested public, especially citizens, remains a
weakness. They are unfamiliar with the FARS’ and
other government web portals, which leads to a
greater workload of the call centres and other direct
points of contact with the authorities.
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